Introduction
Floating armouries around Maldivian waters can potentially pose a significant environmental and security risk to Maldives.
Positioned in the heart of the Indian Ocean, Maldives occupies a pivotal location along the major eastern and western shipping routes, linking the Strait of Hormuz and the Suez Canal in the northwest and the Strait of Malacca in East Asia. Its proximity to the Arabian Sea and the western gateways to Southeast Asia makes it a vital maritime crossroad and a potential chokepoint for overseeing and influencing regional vessel movements, including those carrying weapons.
This analysis highlights the potential security implications and challenges linked to floating armouries for Maldives.
Adverse Impact of Floating Armouries
Floating armouries are commercially owned, modified vessels that store weapons, ammunition, equipment, and basic supplies, often anchored in international waters and used as logistic support vessels. Concentrated mainly in the Red Sea, Gulf of Oman, and Indian Ocean, these ships are typically converted from tugs, research vessels, or patrol boats. Around two dozen such vessels operate under various flags, including those of the Cook Islands, Djibouti, Mongolia, Panama, Sri Lanka, Togo, UAE, and the United Kingdom (UK).
Since 2005, a major shipping corridor in the Indian Ocean – near Sri Lanka, Somalia, Oman, and Djibouti – has been designated a piracy High Risk Area (HRA). Despite naval deployments by conventional powers such as Russia, China, NATO, and the EU, piracy remains a serious concern for shippers. To protect their vessels, many turn to Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSCs). However, international and domestic arms trade laws often restrict these companies from entering foreign ports with weapons, creating logistical and legal challenges for armed maritime security.
Under Article 2 of UNCLOS, coastal states have sovereignty over their territorial waters and can prohibit foreign ships from entering with weapons. However, no such restrictions apply in international waters as per Article 87 of UNCLOS, allowing the rise of floating armouries.
As a result, floating armouries commenced operations in international waters (legal grey area) with minimal oversight, inconsistent vessel registration, and no public records on their operators or weapon stockpiles, leading to a lack of transparency and accountability.
Some floating armouries operate roughly 30 nautical miles offshore, deliberately staying beyond Maldives’ 12-nautical-mile territorial limit to remain in international waters and bypass both national and international regulations. Maldives lacks resources to carry out continuous surveillance work, potentially enabling these armouries to avoid oversight to effectively prevent potential leaking of illegal activities into its territorial waters.
Security Dilemma in the Maritime Domain
On November 3, 1988, nearly 80 armed members of Sri Lanka’s PLOTE hijacked the Maldivian cargo vessel MV Progress Light and attempted to seize control of the capital city of Malé. Though the bid was unsuccessful, the incident revealed the vulnerability of Maldives’ maritime borders (especially in the 1980s) and highlights the need for stronger security measures to safeguard the maritime boundary.
Currently, Maldives has sophisticated technology platforms and well-trained military personnel – for example, in 2024, Maldives National Defence Force (MNDF) launched Türkiye-supplied tactical drones to support monitoring and surveillance activity at sea. However, with limited resources (and multiple challenges the country faces with climate change), the capability of the MNDF Coast Guard to ensure the safety of the foreign (mostly unknown) floating armouries near Maldivian waters, especially against pirates, would seem a challenge – i.e., if inadequately protected, such vessels can be attacked by criminals at sea and turned into security risks. Their stockpiles can also supply weapons to non-state actors, increasing potential threats to sea users in Maldives.
Challenges in Ensuring Safety at Sea
Many of these armouries – often consisting of ageing cargo ships or decommissioned vessels – can fail to meet current International Maritime Organisation (IMO) safety requirements. These vessels often remain anchored in international waters and avoid entering key ports. As a result, they are not subjected to Port State Control (PSC) inspections, which serve as the primary mechanism for ensuring compliance with international maritime safety regulations such as the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS).
In the absence of such inspections, there is little assurance that these vessels adhere to the required international standards for ship construction, equipment, and operational safety. This regulatory gap raises serious concerns about the seaworthiness of floating armouries and the risks they may pose to both the marine environment and maritime security.
Within the Indian Ocean Region, the MV Express Pearl incident off the coast of Sri Lanka highlight the potential risks posed to Maldives by incidents at sea – the potential impacts range from pollution to health risks. Failure to comply with SOLAS Convention can increase the chances of floating armoires causing harmful incidents at sea.
Floating armouries within Maldives’ Search and Rescue Region (SRR) present significant operational challenges. For example, on 18 May 2017, the Maldivian landing craft Maria-3 went missing amid severe weather conditions while it was en route to the central atolls. Despite prompt efforts by MNDF Coast Guard to locate the vessel, the search was hindered by the limitations of deploying larger Search and Rescue (SAR) vessels in such rough seas.
The breakthrough came when an Indian Navy vessel, in Maldives on an official visit, successfully located Maria-3 and ensured the safety of all six individuals onboard. This incident demonstrates the need for the MNDF to acquire critical craft to support its own capacity and mission-readiness.
The MNDF Coast Guard relies primarily on small vessels with restricted endurance, capacity, and equipment, making it difficult to conduct large-scale or long-duration rescue operations at sea. This limitation not only complicates timely responses but also increases the risk to human life and maritime safety within Maldivian waters.
Regional Mechanisms – opportunities and challenges
In 2011, IMO recommended that coastal states bordering key maritime regions, such as the Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean, and Red Sea, develop policies to facilitate the movement of private armed guards and their equipment. IMO also issued guidelines for ship owners and private maritime security companies to carry armed guards and weapons onboard vessels. However, despite these recommendations, there is no unified standard operating procedure or agreed-upon practice among flag states and coastal states for handling the carriage, boarding, disembarkation, or storage of maritime private security arms.
Maldives can assist in formulating new regulations and guidelines by engaging with regional actors, including bilateral partners – i.e., engaging in scaling trilateral combined exercises such as the Exercise DOSTI carried out by Maldives, Sri Lanka and India, to further build capacity to ensure pooling and sharing of resources and better navigate maritime security in and beyond the territorial waters. Such arrangements will effectively enhance small states’ efforts in not only managing floating armouries within their range, but also to set rules for their operational safety and protection against regional threats at sea.
Conclusion
Floating armouries in Maldivian waters pose clear environmental and security threats. Without strong regulation, their presence risks undermining both national security and the fragile marine ecosystem, making it crucial for Maldives to address this issue proactively. Regional actors, such as Sri Lanka and India, can collaborate with Maldives and play a pivotal role in urging international organisations, including the United Nations, to recognise the risks posed by floating armouries. By collectively advocating for stronger oversight and comprehensive regulatory frameworks, small states can help ensure that the challenges associated with floating armouries are addressed in a manner that enhances both regional security and global maritime governance.
Author
Lt Col Ahmed Jameel is a serving officer in the Maldives National Defence Force (MNDF). He has a postgraduate degree in International Relations from Salve Regina University, USA. The author acknowledges that statements, opinions and arguments made are of his own and do not reflect the Maldivian Government’s policy and position.
