Introduction
It was recently reported that India had decided not to participate in the scheduled “Neutral Expert Proceedings” on the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) to be held in Vienna, Austria. The Indian government took this decision since the IWT ‘had been held in abeyance’ after the dastardly terrorist attacks on innocent Indian tourists in April 2025 in Pahalgam. This news came close on the heels of the report stating that the Indian government had communicated to the Bangladeshi side that it wanted to ‘renegotiate’ the Ganga Water Treaty (GWT) that was up for renewal in 2026. India also simultaneously informed the Bangladeshi side that it required more water to meet its development needs.
India’s resource geopolitics takes a realist position. Its water security strategy is no exception. Treaties on the equitable distribution and sharing of water have been the bedrock of India’s regional cooperation with its neighbours. Today, there has been a notable shift in India’s water policy position, prioritising national interests in geopolitics.
Moreover, India’s foreign policy stance on water has been oriented towards protecting Indian interests. This has not prevented its close, lower riparian, (water-dependent and sharing) neighbours, including Bangladesh, from viewing India’s position as antithetical to their interests.
The State and Water in South Asia
Water-based policy can shape and reshape relationships in South Asian societies. For example, ‘control over water’ is pragmatic, and water can act as a socio-political source for power projection. Water was once managed by local communities, including through customary practices.
However, due to increasing environmental challenges and scarcity, its allocation and protection are now overseen by the state – i.e., national policies prioritise supporting water-allocation arrangements within and between societies.
In this respect, the capacity to access water resources can drive India’s realist state in regional politics. On the one hand, for India, water is an essential resource for its growth and development, and its control has been tangibly associated with ideas of national security and international relations. On the other hand, Bangladesh’s accession to the Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (1992 Water Convention) in June 2025 would not change India’s national priorities. Water is a state-level, not federal-level matter. Hence, engaging with international conventions requires attention not only at the federal level policy but also to state-level concerns.
Considering that India’s nationally focused water strategy, which asserts a level of controlled management of water access to neighbours, has a wounding effect, and hence, its reading and assessment must also be done with a thorough understanding of the implications of water at the national development, security and foreign policy level.
India and Access to Water in Context
India’s population is 1.4 billion, which translates to about 18 per cent of the world’s population. Water is one of its most sought-after resources. However, India houses only 4 per cent of the world’s water resources, making it a water-stressed country – i.e., natural and man-made impacts of water, such as seasonal droughts and floods, rapid urbanisation and continued depletion of groundwater resources, pose a potential existential crisis for India’s socio-economic sustainability.
Access to water has been a prerequisite and an integral part of effective state building – i.e., India’s national planning is assertive on water security. National policy must reflect domestic needs and vice versa. Domestic needs can inadvertently prompt India to break away from and reconsider the long-standing tradition of insulating water-sharing cooperation from broader political and military objectives. The Indus Water Treaty is a classic example. And fears are rife among stakeholders that India may follow a similar pattern with the Ganga Water Treaty with Bangladesh in 2026.
India’s Current Position Explained
Traditionally, India has viewed water treaties as a strategic tool for security cooperation. However, India does not have end-to-end access to major water resources. For example, in the Indus River system, India has access to the east-flowing rivers, Ravi, Beas and Sutlej. Water resources from the western rivers, despite flowing through Indian territory, are mostly controlled by Pakistan, India’s western neighbour, an effect driving India to incorporate its national water policy into key aspects of its foreign policy strategy.
In this respect, India’s decision to review its bilateral treaty-based engagement(s) with its lower riparian neighbours, including Pakistan and Bangladesh, can be viewed in terms of India’s effort to become water-resilient, while navigating its national interests in coordinating regional resource-distribution, allocation and management.
For example, there has been a push to divert water flows within India – i.e., to reiterate Prime Minister Narendra Modi: ‘Now, India’s water will flow for India’s benefit, it will be conserved for India’s benefit, and it will be used for India’s progress’.
With this policy stance, India’s decision on the Indus River system has also raised concerns within Bangladesh. For example, some level of stress may lie concerning India’s potential decision to adopt a similar approach to the sharing of the Ganga. For example, India’s lack of foreign policy attention to negotiate the Teesta River treaty with Bangladesh has only created persistent fears among Bangladeshis.
One thing to consider is that, while India has prioritised protecting national water resources, its potential failure to navigate regional arrangements, including bilateral interests, can engender long-term security implications for South Asian relationships.
Conclusion – Moving Forward
India must strategise its communication and public engagements, including policy and political campaigns across its neighbourhood, to ease the fears of neighbouring countries and settle potential water-related disputes or engagements related to existing and newly negotiated agreements. While water may not be the source of conflict in South Asia, it has the potential to become an effective threat multiplier, furthering the emergence of protracted social conflicts.
Vis-à-vis Pakistan, India must consider strategies to renegotiate the Indus Water Treaty by bringing, within the contours of the existing treaty, newer concerns such as groundwater depletion and climate change, hitherto non-existing concerns, during the signing of the treaty. The inclusion of these modern concerns will be a signal to stakeholders that India does not wish to abrogate water-sharing agreements with neighbours, and these steps at abeyance are time-bound interjections to ensure modifications are duly made and incorporated within the text of the treaty.
For example, in Bangladesh’s case, signing the Teesta water treaty will be a considerable confidence-building measure between the two countries. This can also enable India to build a strong domestic constituency within Bangladesh and may enable bipartisan support for ties with India in the long run. In addition, India should renegotiate the Ganga water treaty as well to rebuild trust with its eastern neighbour.
Author
Anuttama Banerji is a Research Associate at the National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi, India. She graduated with a Master’s degree in International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) in 2018. The author acknowledges that statements, opinions and arguments made are of her own and do not reflect the Indian Government’s policies and positions.
