Introduction
On Easter Sunday in April 1942, the Japanese air force raided Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), bombing Colombo and Trincomalee and destroying British military facilities and warships in the vicinity. For the British, the damage was significant, damaging the port, losing an aircraft carrier, two destroyers, a few other ships and HMS Hermes, an aircraft carrier. However, the Japanese, realized, unlike what they had achieved in Pearl Harbour in December 1941, they had failed in destroying Britain’s Eastern Fleet, which was based in Trincomalee – i.e., the intelligence tipped the British Eastern Fleet to make a strategic retreat to Kilindini Kenya and then to Addu (southernmost atoll) in the Maldives.
The moment the British warships, escaping and fighting the German and Japanese submarines and aircraft in the Indian Ocean, entered the Maldives’ waters marked a pivotal point that drew the Maldives, militarily, into the Second World War. It was also logical to believe that, being a British protectorate, the Maldives’ war plans, including the locals’ and the government’s engagements, would be drafted according to the British strategy in the region.
Back then, the Maldives’ foreign policy was dictated by the British, and hence, how the country has positioned itself in regional battles was shaped by a mix of British tactics and local knowledge and recourse.
Militarising a small coastal state and strategic hotspot
The British warships escaping the 1942 Japanese raid, heading further down the southwest to an unknown destination in the Indian Ocean – i.e., the Maldives’ territory –, were sighted by a Japanese aircraft. Subsequently, a Japanese submarine carried out several unsuccessful scouting missions around the Maldives’ waters, failing to locate the British warships. However, given the Maldives’ strategic location in the southwest of Sri Lanka, the country was a prime suspect for harbouring the British warships. Around the same time, both Japanese and German submarine activities (the enemy forces) were, nevertheless, on the rise in the Indian Ocean and getting closer to the Maldives – i.e., later that year, the enemy forces destroyed ships and disrupting the Allied Forces’ supply chains (this includes, the British and its allies’ ships) linking to the Indian Ocean.
Given the strategic location of Addu – i.e., about 600 miles southwest of Sri Lanka and 700 miles north of Diego Garcia –, the Maldives’s territory was crucial for the Allied Forces in rescue efforts in the Arabian Sea, especially the British trade routes, as well as protecting the supply routes in the Indian Ocean, used for sending cargo through Red Sea and to north Africa, to Persian Gulf and through inland to the Soviet front and to assist in the supply of troops for the war in East Asia region, especially in Malaysia, Singapore and Burma.
At the time the Japanese air raid to cripple the British Eastern Fleet in Sri Lanka, Japan was unaware of Port T, the secret military base in the Maldives which was already operational and able to give support services to the Allied naval and shipping fleet, in the southwest Indian Ocean. When the news of an imminent Sri Lanka raid was confirmed, the British Forces had moved much of the Eastern Fleet to Kilindini in Kenya and Addu in the Maldives, saving most of the ships of the Eastern Fleet that was crucial in defending, defeating, and preventing enemy attacks and activities in the Indian ocean.
Port T in Addu remained unknown and undiscovered by the enemy forces until the latter years of the War in 1944, when a German U-boat torpedoed British Loyalty, a fuel storage ship, anchored in Addu Atoll. The sound of the explosion and the fireballs produced by the spilling fuel, lighting up the night sky, and witnessed by the locals, sounded the alarm bells of a chilling reality of the danger Addu Atoll could be in, especially if the Atoll became a target of larger enemy raids, like the one met by the British’s Sri Lanka base in April 1942.
Localising a regional war, great power impacts
Until then, in the innocent minds of the locals, who were living with the British troops in Addu, it was more of an opportunity to sell local goods to the visitors or watch the visiting submarines, warships, and aircraft carriers in their Atoll. Little did they realise – not until the British Loyalty explosion – that living with World War soldiers also involved facing a grim sense of fear and insecurity and becoming a direct target of an enemy attack.
Even much before the British Loyalty explosion, Maldivians were already facing the hardships associated with food shortages, famine, and hunger, creating economic and social concerns for the island communities – this was marked as the worst famine in the country’s history.
Immediately after the Japanese raids on Colombo and Trincomalee in 1942, local merchant vessels from the Maldives ceased operations between the two countries due to security concerns. This disruption had dire consequences for a nation heavily reliant on imported food and fuel, exacerbating the ongoing famine and its hardships. Additionally, the surrounding seas became perilous for fishing, further deepening the struggles of an already suffering population.
Despite the fear and cries for help, the hopelessness of a widespread famine and mass starvation, leading to multiple daily deaths in some islands, the Maldives and its people stood as a staunch partner and participant, doing whatever and however they could, in their effort to help the Allied Forces’ war efforts, and bring back life as it was in their seas.
The terms of national foreign policy
The Maldivian Government – i.e., as a British protectorate, the Maldives’ rule was given a level of political independence to run domestic issues – decided to give the whole Addu Atoll to the British war efforts. The locals there would end up taking part in these efforts. The risk factors of this decision were more of a reality than an imagination after the Sri Lanka incident.
Rather than weighing the pain, suffering and devastation the Second World War had brought to the shores of the nation, the Addu decision was taken as a national interest, an obligation to stand by with Britain, in their efforts to end the War – i.e., demonstrating the Maldives’ role in achieving global order, peace and security. Despite the small size, the decision to align with the British cause helped the Maldives to navigate its security in the regional conflict, successfully bringing this Indian Ocean war chapter to an end.
Conclusion
The lesson we had learnt was that the Maldives’ role in the Second World War showed the strategic importance and the central role this small state had played in shaping strategic partnerships, to protect its territory and show commitment to support a global war campaign.
Author
Dr Ahmed Zaki Nafiz is an Assistant Professor in Journalism at the Maldives National University. He holds a PhD in Journalism from the University of Canterbury in New Zealand. At The Maldives National University, Dr Zaki teaches Journalism, Politics and Maldivian History. Currently, his main research interest is writing about War, History and Politics, related to the Maldives.
