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EDITOR'S NOTE

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<i>Editorial</i>	6
OPINION ARTICLES	
Islam and Radicalism: A brief History <i>Mohamed M M Ismail</i>	7
Countering Terrorism in South Asia: Beyond Statist Approaches <i>Imtiaz Ahmed</i>	19
Fostering Community Resilliance fot Preventing Violent Extremis: Perspective from South Asia <i>Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh</i>	35

Editorial Policy and Notes for Contributors

The Maldives National Journal of Research

The Maldives National Journal of Research (MNJR) is a research journal of The Maldives National University published by the Postgraduate Research Centre. MNJR is a multidisciplinary journal of research in all disciplines relevant to the Maldives. Although in the coming years, it is expected that this journal will evolve into specialist journals in various disciplines, the first one is generalist in nature. The journal publishes research articles, literature reviews, book reviews, comments, opinion and perspectives.

Objectives. The justification for publishing a journal arises from the need to create and disseminate knowledge — an objective enshrined in the MNU Act. It is unlikely that our staff and students are able to access international journals of repute for publishing their research and studies. The journal will be available both on paper and in digital form. Paper-based journals still have a permanence rarely achieved by digital editions. The objectives of the journal are:

1. to promote research and scholarly enquiry,
2. to provide a vehicle for publication of student and staff research,
3. to report opinion and commentary on social, economic and political developments of the country,
4. to publish position papers, criticisms on papers published in the journal or issues of general interest to the university or the nation,
5. to review books, magazines, articles, movies and other artistic, or scholarly creations, and
6. to contribute to the progress in education and learning.

Frequency. Initially annually, and thereafter biennially (in July and December) in both digital and printed versions.

Size. Approximately 175 x 250 mm (print version).

Pages. 100 (print version).

Criteria for publication. MNJR primarily publishes papers describing original research. Papers must contain new results to be published. Further, submission of an article to MNJR implies that it has not been published or submitted elsewhere. However, conference papers may be included in an article provided that significantly more details on the subject are incorporated. MNJR accepts papers written only in Dhivehi and English. It is the responsibility of the author(s) to ensure that the articles are free from grammar and other errors. Important criteria in the selection process for publication are quality of argument and execution, clarity in presentation and educational significance. Articles must not be more than 20 pages as they appear in A4 paper one and

a half spaced. All submissions must include an abstract of not more than 200 words except submissions to Opinions and Perspectives. All graphics must be in 300 dpi resolution. Manuscripts should be submitted by a single corresponding author.

Papers that, in the opinion of the reviewer or editor, fall short of the above standards will be rejected.

Submissions. The emailed version must be written in Microsoft Word or in Rich Text Format, one and a half spaced. As articles will be reviewed, all information identifying the author(s) should be highlighted so that review copies can have this information removed as necessary and sent to referees.

All submissions should be emailed to mizna.mohamed@mnu.edu.mv.

Referencing style. MNJR uses the referencing and style conventions of the American Psychological Association.

Peer Review. MNJR intends to have all manuscripts reviewed by two referees, whenever possible by peers with the exception of submissions to sections dealing with Opinions, Perspectives and Comments. The Editor selects two reviewers from the Editorial Committee. The process is double-blind. The reviewers are identified to the author and vice-versa only after the review process is over. If the article falls outside the expertise of the Editorial Committee, guest reviewers with specific expertise may be consulted.

Content. *Research Reports* contain original research that advances our understanding in the given field. *Review Articles* are critical evaluations of material that has been already published. The writer may define and clarify the problem, and take a position on an issue. *Opinions, Perspectives and Comments* provides a forum for discussion and debate about previously published material or important current issues, innovations and policy perspectives in clearly written commentaries. No abstract is required nor the submission is peer reviewed.

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Editorial |

Developing a research culture and building quality researchers to enhance evidence based decision making is one of the key visions of the Maldives National University. In line with this, the Maldives National Journal of Research (MNJR) was developed to engage people from different disciplines in high quality research and provide a platform for publication and dissemination of these results. Each issue is presented with original research, opinions and commentaries which provides important recommendations on different research areas and social issues.

This is a special issue which focuses on terrorism in South Asia, its effects on the societies and ways on how to counter terrorism.

Although terrorism is usually defined as the use of violent acts to create terror in a way of trying to achieve political goals, today's world erroneously associates terrorism with religion, more specifically with Islam. This has created Islamophobia and has led to several negative allegations on Muslims. Hence, this issue brings together ideas from renowned scholars from South Asia who has described the issue in precise detail.

My sincere gratitude goes to the scholars who have contributed by writing a paper for this issue. I also thank United Nations in Maldives for taking the initiative and providing their support in publishing the issue. Last but not least, I want to thank the editorial consultants who have put in their thoughts and insights in strengthening the issue.

Dr. Ali Fawaz Shareef
Editor
MNJR

Islam and Radicalism: A Brief History

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ABSTRACT *This article explains the nature of Islam and its tolerance. It sheds light on Medina constitution as one nation in order to understand the relation between Muslims and non-Muslims in the state of Medina. Jihad has long proven to be one of the most controversial terms therefore, the study sheds light on the violent interpretations of jihad by two radical Islamic scholars Abul A'la Al-Maududi and Seyyid Qutub. Their call for unrestricted war against the enemies of Islam has had a direct influence on extremist militant groups like Al Qaeda and ISIS who have carried out terrorist attacks on an international scale, delegitimized the existing Muslim governments, and called for the restoration of the caliphate throughout the Islamic world. The understanding of jihad should be conducted with an awareness of the controversial nature and the ambiguity surrounding the concept in the modern context of terrorism and religious extremism. In response to the propagators of the offensive theory of jihad who keep feeding the already circulating misconceptions about Islam as a violent and intolerant religion, I provide scholarly evidence to the centrality of peace and tolerance in Islam. .*

Key words: Islam, radicalism, Medina constitution jihad, tolerance, Maududi, Qutub, Al-Qaeda, ISIS

Introduction

There is a widely prevailing, but often misconceived, notion that Islam lacks a consistent teaching or practice of pacifism and that it is by nature and design a violent religion which calls upon its followers to wage unceasing war against non-Muslims. It is also alleged that Islam prohibits all freedom of religion, spreads its faith by the power of the sword alone, and does not tolerate any criticism of its teachings. When the principles of nonviolence and concepts of peace are evoked in the context of Islam, they tend to be associated not with the life of the vast majority of Muslims, but with the practices of a few minority sects. These misconceptions are, in fact, reinforced by the intemperate words and actions of some contemporary Muslim extremists who justify armed violence under the supposed pretext of fulfilling the teachings of Islam. However, as professed by Prophet Muhammad, Islam repudiates the extreme doctrines that manipulate and exploit faith “to give religious sanction to what are in actuality social and political agendas” (Aslan, 2005)

Definition of Islam

The literal meaning of word Islam is “Peace”. The word Islam is derived from the Arabic root “Salema”: peace, purity, submission and obedience. In the

religious sense, Islam means submission to the will of God and obedience to His law. Islam dates back to the edge of Adam and its message has been conveyed to human beings by God's Prophets and Messengers including Abraham, Moses, Jesus and Muhammad (peace be upon them). Islam's message has been restored and enforced in the last stage of the religious evolution by God's last Prophet and Messenger Muhammad (pbuh). Therefore a religion that has such a name is natural to be more close to moderation than radicalism and Islam is moderation and harmony in every aspect of life with no extremism or rigidness.

Tolerance in Islam

Islam is a religion of mercy to all people, both Muslims and non-Muslims. There is no place for religious intolerance or radicalism in Islam. The Holy Prophet (pbuh) was described as being a mercy in the Quran due to the message he brought for humanity: Allah says: "We sent thee not, but as a mercy for all creatures." (Quran, 21:107). When a person analyses the legislations of Islam with an open mind, the Mercy mentioned in the above quoted verse becomes apparent. One of the aspects of this Mercy can be seen by the way the legislations of Islam deal with people of other faiths. "The tolerant attitude of Islam towards non-Muslims, whether they be those residing in their own countries or within the Muslim lands, can be clearly seen through a study of history" (Said, Funk, and Kadayifci: 2001).

Intrinsic to the socio-political dispensation of the Quran is tolerance of other faiths and the recognition of the individual's freedom of choice and liberty of conscience. This cardinal principle finds endorsement in several passages like "There is no compulsion in religion" (Quran, 2:256), and like "To you [the non-Muslims] your religion, and to me [the Prophet] mine" (Quran, 109:6). The Quran is full of other statements showing that belief in this or that religion is a person's own concern. (1) The categorical prohibition of coercion in anything that pertains to faith is so clear and strong that any attempt at forcing a non-believer to accept the faith of Islam is a grievous sin, a verdict which disposes of the allegation that Islam places before the unbelievers the alternative of "conversion or the sword." The Prophet was tolerant to Jews and Christians, for instance, and these religions have at all times been allowed in Muslim lands. More interestingly, many Muslim scholars argue that the Quran includes under the category of believers not only Muslims but also "whoever believes in God and the Day of Judgment and does good" (Quran, 5:69). Whether Muslims, Jews, or Christians, these believers "shall have no fear, neither shall they grieve" (Quran, 5:69).

In the Medinan society since the upper hand was with the Muslims, the Holy Prophet (pbuh) strictly warned against any maltreatment of people of other faiths: "Beware! Whoever is cruel and hard on a non-Muslim minority, or curtails their rights, or burdens them with more than they can bear, or takes anything from them against their free will; I (Prophet Muhammad) will complain against the person on the Day of Judgment." (Hadith, Abu Dawud). The Holy Prophet (pbuh) was conscious of the responsibility Muslim

leadership had towards respecting and tolerating other religions. He made it clear that anything other than tolerance would not be tolerated, and that, although all were members of a society, each had their separate religion which could not be violated. Each was allowed to practice their beliefs freely without any hindrances, and no acts of provocation would be tolerated.

The Arabian Peninsula during the time of the Prophet (pbuh) was a region in which various faiths were present. There were Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians, polytheists, and others not affiliated with any religion. When one looks into the life of the Prophet (pbuh), one may draw on many examples to portray the high level of tolerance shown to people of other faiths. In order to understand and judge this tolerance, one must look into the period in which Islam was a formal state, with the specific laws laid down by the Prophet (pbuh) in accordance with the tenets of religion. Even though one can observe many examples of tolerance shown by the Prophet (pbuh) in the thirteen years of his stay in Mecca, one may incorrectly think that it was only due to seeking to raise the profile of the Muslims and the social status of Islam and in general. For this reason, the discussion will be limited to the period which commenced with the migration of the Prophet (pbuh) to Medina, and specifically once the constitution was set.

Medina Constitution

The best example of the tolerance shown by the Prophet (pbuh) to other religions may be the constitution itself, called the “Saheefah” by early historians. When the Prophet (pbuh) migrated to Medina, his role as a mere religious leader ended; he was now the political leader of a state, governed by the precepts of Islam, which demanded that clear laws of governance be laid out to ensure harmony and stability in a society which once had been distraught by decades of war, one which must ensure the peaceful coexistence of Muslims, Jews, Christians and polytheists. Due to this, the Prophet (pbuh) laid down a ‘constitution’ which detailed the responsibilities of all parties which resided in Medina, their obligations towards each other, and certain restrictions which were placed on each. All parties were to obey what was mentioned therein, and any breach of its articles was regarded as an act of treachery.

One Nation

The first article of the constitution was that all the inhabitants of Medina, the Muslims as well as those who had entered the pact from the Jews, Christian, and idolaters, were “one nation to the exclusion of all others.” (Dhiya,1994) All were considered members and citizens of Medina society regardless of religion, race, or ancestry. People of other faiths were protected from harm as much as the Muslims, as is stated in another article, “To the Jews who follow us belong help and equity. He shall not be harmed nor his enemies be aided.” (Dhiya, 1994) Previously, each tribe had their alliances and enemies within and without Medina. The Prophet (pbuh) gathered these different tribes under one system of governance which upheld pacts of alliances previously in existence between those individual tribes. All tribes had to act as a whole with disregard to individual alliances. Any attack on other religion or tribe was considered an

attack on the state and upon the Muslims as well.

There are many other articles of this constitution which may be discussed, but emphasis will be placed on an article which states, "If any dispute or controversy likely to cause trouble should arise, it must be referred to God and His Messenger." (Dhiya,1994) This clause maintained that all inhabitants of the state must recognize a higher level of authority, and in those matters which involved various tribes and religions, justice could not be meted out by individual leaders; rather it must be adjudicated by the leader of the state himself or his designated representatives. It was allowed, however, for individual tribes who were not Muslims, to refer to their own religious scriptures and their learned men in regards to their own personal affairs. They could though, if they opted, ask the Prophet to judge between them in their matters. God says in the Quran: "...If they do come to thee, either judge between them or decline to interfere..." (Quran 5:42). Here we see that the Prophet (pbuh) allowed each religion to judge in their own matters according to their own scriptures, as long as it did not stand in opposition to articles of the constitution, a pact which took into account the greater benefit of the peaceful co-existence of society. This fact is not only purported by Muslims, but many non-Muslim historians also accept it.

Marmaduke Pickthall (1) states: "In the eyes of history, religious toleration is the highest evidence of culture in a people. It was not until the Western nations broke away from their religious law that they became more tolerant, and it was only when the Muslims fell away from their religious law that they declined in tolerance and other evidences of the highest culture. Before the coming of Islam, tolerance had never been preached as an essential part of religion. The tolerance within the body of Islam was, and is, something without parallel in history; class and race and colour ceasing altogether to be barriers". (Pickthall, 2014) The benevolence of Allah and Islam is not limited to Muslims alone.

Patriarch Ghaytho, a Christian historian analysing the attitudes of Islamic religion towards non-Muslims, wrote: "The Arabs, to whom the Lord has given control over the world, treat us as you know; they are not the enemies of Christians. Indeed, they praise our community, and treat our priests and saints with dignity, and offer aid to churches and monasteries." (The Egypt Gazette: 2013). Will Durant in his renowned work comments: "At the time of the Umayyad caliphate, the people of the covenant, Christians, Zoroastrians, Jews, and Sabians, all enjoyed degree of tolerance that we do not find even today in Christian countries. They were free to practice the rituals of their religion and their churches and temples were preserved. They enjoyed autonomy in that they were subject to the religious laws of the scholars and judges." (Durant, 2013).

These relations between Muslims and people of other faiths were not due to mere politics played by Muslim rulers, but rather they were a direct result of the teachings of Islam, which preaches that people of other religions be free to practice their own faith, only accepting the guidance offered by Islam by

their own choice. Allah ordains in the Quran: "Let there be no compulsion in religion..." (Quran, 2:256)

Not only does Islam demand their freedom to practice religion, but also that they be treated justly as any other fellow human. Warning against any abuse of non-Muslims in an Islamic society, the Prophet (pbuh) stated: "Beware! Whoever is cruel and hard on a non-Muslim minority, curtails their rights, burdens them with more than they can bear, or takes anything from them against their free will; I (Prophet Muhammad) will complain against the person on the Day of Judgment." (Hadith, Abu Dawud). Extremism and religious intolerance are the evil that imperil the existence of society. They strengthen chauvinism and weaken the rational approach to life.

Islam abhors needless killing and exhorts the protection of the lives of entire humanity. The Quran is emphatic: "If you kill an innocent human, it is as though you have killed the entire humanity." (Quran, 5:32). The beauty of this verse is that Allah pointedly decries the slaying of all humanity and not Muslims alone. Many mistakenly believe that Islam does not tolerate the existence of other religions present in the world. The lives of the practitioners of other religions in the Muslim society are also given protective status. In addition to the Quranic teachings, the Holy Prophet (pbuh) exhorted: "Whoever kills a person who has a truce with the Muslims will never smell the fragrance of Paradise." (Hadith: Saheeh al-Bukhari)

When history contradicts this fact, it also shows that, on particular occasions, Muslims have belied the teachings of their Prophet Muhammad and the precepts of the Quran. When Osama bin Laden, who is widely assumed to be the force behind the September 11 hijackings in the United States, cites the Quran as the inspiration for his group's actions, he is presenting his own equivocal interpretation of jihad, a Quranic concept which may have numerous meanings except the killing of civilians. Jihad literally means struggle or striving, an exertion or great effort. Its primary religious connotation is the inward or spiritual struggle to overcome evil and reach a state of moral perfection and complete submission to God. In short, it is the personal struggle to become a better Muslim. The Quran is specific with regard to the nature of this internal struggle because in order for people to be at peace with themselves, they must seek spiritual purity and control their baser instincts such as greed, lust, and cruelty. This quest is featured widely in the Quran as the greater, true or mighty jihad, and has nothing to do with violence and war.⁽²⁾ The struggle is familiar to adherents of any religion trying temper inclinations towards evil with an ongoing commitment to righteousness (Hussain,2012).

The call for the believer to struggle against oppression and tyranny, by military means if necessary, is a lesser jihad which does not completely accord with how Muhammad originally intended the term, nor with how many scholars through the ages have interpreted it (Cortright, 2008 and Aziz, 2007). T. B. Irving notes that: "In proper translation, jihad does not mean 'holy war' except by extension, but it has been debased by this meaning, which is a journalistic usage" (Irving, 1979). The Quran, however, clearly allows Muslims the use of force, but only in self defence against only those who attack them or oppress

them: "Permission [to fight] is given to those on whom war is made ... Those who are driven from their homes without a just cause except that they say: Our Lord is Allah. And if Allah did not repel some people by others, then cloisters and churches and synagogues and mosques in which Allah's name is much remembered, would have been pulled down" (Quran, 22: 39-40). Thus, Muslims were fighting to defend the right of every religion to be practiced freely and openly. The defensive character of a fight in "God's cause" is maintained throughout the Quran as evident from Chapter 60, verse 8 (mentioned earlier), as well as from Chapter 4, verse 91. (3)

But if the believers are enjoined to fight back when they are attacked, the words of "Fight in the cause of God those who fight you, but do not transgress limits; for God loveth not transgressors" (Quran, 2: 190), make it clear that they must, when fighting, abstain from all atrocities and from inflicting unnecessary damage. Furthermore, and in accordance with the injunctions "if they incline to peace, incline thou to it as well" (Quran, 8: 61), and "if they desist [from fighting] then all hostility shall cease" (Quran, 2: 193), the believers are obliged to make peace with an enemy who makes it clear that they want to come to an equitable understanding.

Nevertheless, the idea that the Islamic tradition condemns violence and promotes peace and tolerance has only partial correspondence to observed reality. Different historical episodes in which Islam has been involved have made Islam and violence become synonymous in the mind of many non-Muslims, and a negative valence started to be associated with Muslims. As early as the 6th century, Muslims felt obliged to extend the faith to unbelievers. Even if the original concept of jihad did not include warfare against non-Muslims, wars of expansion were advanced by the devotion of the Caliphs to an interpretation of the Quran which allowed them the latitude of conquering lands and peoples outside the Arabian Peninsula. By the 8th century, Islam had vastly increased its territory to include the Middle East, the Near East, North Africa, most of the Iberian Peninsula, Southwest France and Central Asia. In addition to the use of military power in the spread of Islam, the imposition of a personal tax on all non-Muslims forced many of those who did not wish to pay the tax to become converts. Therefore, though much of the population in conquered geographies might have accepted Islam for a variety of social and economic reasons as well as for the appeal of its teachings, it would be difficult to argue that it was not the victories of Muslim armies which brought Muslim faith to those lands, and that some sort of forced conversions did not occur.

More recently, the misuse of Islam to legitimize violence has become a popular tendency among many influential individuals and groups. Abul A'la Maududi, a celebrated Muslim political philosopher and theologian, gave a speech in Lahore, Pakistan, in 1939 where he claims that: "In reality Islam is a revolutionary ideology and programme which seeks to alter the social order of the whole world and rebuild it in conformity with its own tenets and ideals. 'Muslim' is the title of that International Revolutionary Party organized by Islam to carry into effect its revolutionary programme. And 'Jihad' refers to

that revolutionary struggle and utmost exertion which the Islamic Party brings into play to achieve this objective” (Al-Tamimi: 2014).

What is striking in Maududi’s words is the hybrid connotations he imparts to jihad by fusing the primary ideal of the striving on the path to God, which could under specific conditions permit the recourse to violence as a form of defence, with communist ideas about the party as the basis of a revolutionary struggle that would bring a global political transformation through human agency. He further assigns this human agency the role of “destroying all States and Governments anywhere on the face of the earth which are opposed to the ideology and programme of Islam” (Maududi, 2006) so as to “establish in their stead an Islamic system of State rule” (Maududi, 2006).

Maududi had a direct influence on Egyptian Islamic theorist Sayyid Qutub whose *Milestones* would become probably the essential charter and the manifesto of action for several Islamist fundamentalist movements. Qutub claims that modern societies, both Islamic and Western, are living in a state of ignorance and darkness resembling the state of *Jahiliyya* (pre-Islamic era) in the Arabian Peninsula. This is because contemporary societies are organized on the basis of man-made laws that run counter to the Shariah bequeathed by God to humanity through Prophet Muhammad. Qutub argues for the creation of a universal community (*Umma*) accepting Allah’s sovereignty on earth and united under Islam’s banner of equality and brotherhood. Yet, he avows that the realization of this vision needs more than peaceful means: The establishment of Allah’s kingdom on earth, the elimination of the reign of man, the wresting of sovereignty from its usurpers and its restoration to Allah, and the abolition of human laws and implementation of the divine law “Shariah” cannot be achieved only through sermons and preaching. Those who have usurped Allah’s authority on earth and have enslaved His creatures will not surrender their power merely through preaching (Qutub: 1987). The social, economic, political and racial human forces blocking the path to God and alienating faith from the public sphere are too powerful to be conquered by preaching and persuasion alone. As such, militancy becomes the only way to bringing the rulership of God. A violent interpretation of jihad is the watchword in the end of Qutub ideologizing. It is the means for shifting human beings from bondage to anyone or anything to complete submission to the Lord.

Qutub advocates a militant interpretation of the concept of jihad as an anti-apostate attitude which he draws from his own understanding of key Quranic passages as well as from the views of fourteenth-century Sunni theologian, Ibn Taimiya. Qutub rejects the notion of jihad merely as a defensive mechanism or as an inner struggle for self-righteousness as argued by many classical and modernist scholars, and avoids citing any of the verses typically used to describe the undertaking of jihad via nonmilitant methods. Apparently ignoring context and exegesis, and without proper attention to the mechanics of how jihad is to be declared, undertaken and concluded, Qutub claims the existence of a developmental idea of jihad in the Quran. According to this view, Prophet Muhammad received revelations on jihad in three stages: tolerance, defensive,

and offensive. Qutub cites the verses that demonstrate God's progressive granting of permission to Muslims to engage in jihad of the sword which culminate in Chapter 9, verses 29 and 36. (4) Following this logic, offensive warfare against all polytheists and apostates is now the divine diktat so as to establish the hegemony of Shariah law. (Qutub, 1987)

Because he views the conflict between good and evil as one of cosmic proportions, Qutub needed to justify his call for unrestricted jihad against the enemies of Islam not only abroad but also at home so he resorted to the authority of Ibn Taimiya. The latter issued a fatwa allowing the Muslim Mamluk authorities to attack Muslim Mongols. According to Ibn Taimiya, although the Mongols had made a Muslim confession of faith, they followed not the commands of Islam but a code of behavior set down by Genghis Khan, thus rendering themselves apostates and therefore a legitimate target of jihad. Believing that a vast ocean of Jahiliyyah has encompassed the entire world, and convinced that whoever does not respect the injunctions of the Lord is, in effect, guilty of apostasy, Qutub declares the small, separated cells of "true" believers to be in a state of war against the rest of the world: "We are the Ummah of the believers, living within a Jahili society. ... As a community of believers we should see ourselves in a state of war with the state and the society. The territory we dwell in is Daru Al-Harb "the House of War" (Karch, 2006).

The works of Maududi and Qutub have been widely read, and their theories have contributed significantly to the radicalization of the thinking of many Muslim youths worldwide. Qutub, in particular, is believed to have been "the bridge to the more radical contemporary strains prevalent today" (Burke, 2004). Mass movements whose objectives are, to different extents, grounded in the Qutbian rhetoric include the Muslim Brotherhood, of which Qutub was a leading member, the Lebanese Shiite organization Hizbollah, Al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). However, whereas the first two groups remain focused on local goals, Al-Qaeda and ISIS have espoused more expansive political objectives, mainly the removal of existing Muslim governments and borders along with the restoration of the caliphate throughout the Islamic world.

Al-Qaeda is globally notorious for using terrorism as a deliberate tactic to punish the United States for its support to Israel and for its presence and influence in Muslim lands. It also identifies United States' allies as legitimate targets of violence. Since 1992, Al-Qaeda has planned and carried out a string of deadly suicide attacks in places as varied as Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Tanzania, Morocco, Tunisia, the U.S., England, and Spain with an enormous human toll, the majority being innocent civilians including people of the Muslim faith. Interestingly, Al-Qaeda does not present itself as a mere nihilist group that revel in inflicting destruction and death indiscriminately. In many of their public statements, Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri make frequent analogies between Al-Qaeda's acts and past Islamic practices, and they quote from the Quran and Hadith to show that their organization is acting within the confines of Islamic

law". (Ali, 2016). This has led to corroborating the idea that terrorism and violence are intrinsic characteristics of Islam.

ISIS, on the other hand, is a radical militant group active in Syria and Iraq, but with aspirations that strive to dominate the entire world. It grew significantly as an organization due to its involvement in the war in Syria, where it fights both Assad's troops and the rebel factions that oppose its ideology and plans. In Iraq, it enjoys substantial support among Iraqi Sunnis who have suffered economic and political discrimination after the fall of Saddam Hussein.

ISIS is known for its adherence to an extremely violent theory of transnational jihad, even by Al-Qaeda measures. In addition to government and military targets, it attacks Shia Muslims and Christians. It believes "that there are only three choices in Islam: conversion, subjugation, or death" (Al-Tamimi, 2014). On 29 June 2014, ISIS changed its name to just the Islamic State and proclaimed itself a caliphate in the stretches of Syria and Iraq that have fallen under its control. The group's chief Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was named the Caliph, which presumably bestows him with authority over all Muslims, and Muslims everywhere were demanded to swear allegiance. "Upon declaring a caliphate, ISIS has become increasingly emboldened to express the global jihad movement's true long term goal" (Maher, 2016), namely the elimination of the borders, laws and authority of current states and the establishment of an Islamic State that should encompass the whole world.

The fact that the proponents of the offensive theory of jihad, like Maududi and Qutub, and the perpetrators of terror, like Al-Qaeda and ISIS, use Quran to justify their violent tendencies has indeed created a paranoid fear about Muslims. Amir Hussein has even noticed the rise of what he terms "misoislamia, a neologism that captures the move from a fear (phobia) to a hatred (miso) for Islam and Muslims" (Hussain, 2012). Nevertheless, Jawaid Quddus points out that "to judge Islam by the conduct of a minority of its people is misleading. It stigmatizes a vast majority of law abiding peaceful citizens" (Quddus, 2005). After drawing on extensive statistics, Quddus reminds that in the Western media hoopla of trying to present Islam as the root of all terrorist acts, a basic fact is forgotten, namely that "most of the victims of terrorism are Muslims" (Quddus, 2005). Consequently, ordinary Muslims have the same reasons to fear for their lives from the terrorist follies of "these overnight propaganda merchants posing as Islamic scholars (but whose) forays into the study of Islam has been very superficial, biased and without critical thinking" (Quddus: 2005).

Likewise, Niaz A. Shah does not agree with Maududi and Qutb's justification of violence because, first, "the offensive theory of Jihad is against the Quranic code of armed conflict with non-Muslims and the inherent principles of neutrality, that is, fight only those who fight you" (Niaz: 2008), and, second, "a contextual interpretation of the verses they rely on brings a different meaning to them" (Niaz, 2008). Thus, when violence is mentioned in the Quran, "it is a violence that is contextualized, meaning it occurs in the context of warfare between Muslims and polytheists," and, very importantly, "it is a violence that

is tempered” (Hussain, 2012). Tempering violence refers to the strict code of behaviour prescribed by the Quran to minimize the damage likely to occur during an armed conflict. According to Quddus, this includes:

Not attacking a wounded person, not attacking or killing non-combatants such as any old person, any child or women, monks in monasteries or people sitting in places of worship. In addition, it specifically prohibited to kill a prisoner of war, indulge in loot or plunder, destruction of villages, cattle, cultivated fields, trees and gardens. Muslims are prohibited from taking anything from the general public ... without paying for it. Needless to say, Muslims are also prohibited from mutilating the corpses of the enemies and are to return the bodies of dead enemy soldiers without delay or compensation (Quddus, 2005). Quddus concludes that “although people of the Islamic faith around the world have violated all of the above rules some of the time, they have done so despite Islam and not because of Islam” (Quddus, 2005).

In similar condemnation of and resentment for those who terrorize others in the name of Islam, Muslim legal scholar Khaled Abu El Fadl observes: “The classical jurists, nearly without exception, argued that those who attack by stealth, while targeting non-combatants in order to terrorize the resident and wayfarer, are corrupters of the earth” (Khaled, 2007). He further adds: “Those guilty of this crime were considered enemies of humankind and were not to be given quarter or sanctuary anywhere” (Khaled, 2007). The jihadists who commit acts of terror or strive to provide a theoretical basis for it do not necessarily represent Islam and the great majority of Muslims. It does not matter if they are videotaped reciting verses of the Quran or yelling “Allahu Akbar.” It does not matter if they have written books that got reprinted or translated to most languages. They are simply a misguided few who instead of giving non-Muslims the opportunity to appreciate Islam, they give them reasons to fear and hate it.

Conclusion

In a nutshell, Islam is not a religion of radicalism but moderation and harmony in every aspect of life. However, for that Muslims thoroughly study and learn Quran and follow the teachings of Holy Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) which would ultimately bring the true picture of Islam in front of the entire world. The prevalence of media bias and ignorance regarding Islam can be countered by understanding Islam through its proper teachings. That means referring to the Quran (which Muslims believe to be the word of God) and the authentic sayings of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). Through the proper understanding of these teachings, one will discover Islam to be completely against any form of extremism. The Islam emphasizes peace and reconciliation as basic to all social and even international relations. One of the ninety-nine names of God is Salaam, which means peace. Throughout history, Muslims have made every effort to establish peace and serenity everywhere

in all divergent fields, only taking military measures when their enemies tried to hinder these efforts for humankind. Over the course of history, the general approach of Muslims has been supportive of maintaining tolerance, spreading an environment of serenity and trust, and constructing a civilization of love, compassion, and mercy to share with other people in peace. Jihad is not a violent concept and it is not a declaration of war against other religions. Military action in the name of Islam has not been common in the history of Islam and calling for violent jihad is not sanctioned by Islam.

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Countering Terror in South Asia: Beyond Statist Approaches

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While social and communal factors influence motivations, less attention is often paid to the environment in which individuals are either radicalized or deradicalized and the role that families and communities might play in this regard. The question of communities tends to come into the equation of strategies to counter terrorism, violent extremism and radicalization under two different lenses: One scrutiny, based on a negative narrative, focuses on how the community creates conditions for its members to become radicalized. These often happen in places where members of religious communities where unforgiving versions of religion is being taught including places like prisons which are notorious hotbeds of radicalization through exchanges among prisoners; and even within families which help recruit brothers, wives etc. into so-called Jihad, such as is often the case in Central Asia. This paper will focus on certain misconceptions of Islam.

Key words: Islam, radicalism, deradicalization, tolerance, security, jihad, terrorism

Introduction

When it comes to the spectre of terror or insecurity few could match the dystopias put forward by two well-known novelists, one incidentally from the last century while the other from this century. The first one refers to the insecurity arising from the fear of 'Big Brother is Watching You,' so insightfully depicted by George Orwell in his novel, 1984. The novel was published at the end of World War II in 1949. Critics in the beginning thought that Orwell was reflecting on 'socialism,' the totalitarian regime of the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin, or the British Labour Party, but 'he was not (West,1985).'

Following the discovery of an extraordinary cache of Orwell material in the archives of the BBC, coincidentally in 1984, it became clear that Orwell got the idea while working at the BBC during wartime (August 1941-November 1943). Indeed, it is at the BBC where Orwell felt that the 'Big Brother - 'the state' - was always watching him. As W.J. West in his introduction to George Orwell's Lost Writings noted, "The totalitarian atmosphere of Nineteen Eighty-Four - of universal censorship that alters the past as well as the present and even attempts to alter the mind - was the ultimate development of Orwell's experience of censorship at the BBC at the hands of the MOI (Ministry of Information) (West, 1985, p.21)." West further commented, "The fact that the lowest rank of censor, 'delegate censors', were not from the Ministry of Information but colleagues within the BBC, indeed, within one's own

department, could make life tense in the sort of situation in which people like Orwell often found themselves....In effect everyone could be seen as checking on everyone else, just as Orwell describes Comrade Tillotson in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* doing the same task as Winston Smith (West, 1985, p.280).”

The victory over the Nazis and the end of World War II otherwise gave way not so much to the freedom of the individual as much to an Orwellian dystopia. The ‘Big Brother’ soon got engaged in the task of watching and securing the life and living of the humans and busied itself in creating weapons of enormous power, indeed, on such a frightful scale that it could now collectively destroy the earth not once, as the divine prophesied, but nine times. I am, of course, referring to the thousands of nuclear weapons in kilotons and megatons that are now in possession of the ‘state’ of various types - from liberal, authoritarian, totalitarian to ‘capi-communist’ (Napoleoni, 2011, p11) - and spreading across three continents. But this is only one side of the matter.

The ‘Big Brother’ is also watching the citizens more closely and frequently than ever. In fact, the average urban Briton is caught on camera up to 300 times a day, often without the person’s knowledge. As Jessica Williams highlights the chilling development of the science of monitoring now at the service of the state:

Researchers estimate that in a single day, a citizen of London could expect to be filmed by more than 300 cameras on more than 30 separate CCTV systems.... Far from seeking to protect privacy, the British government has been expanding the ways in which it can watch its citizens. The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) gave the Home Secretary power to issue warrants for the interception of communications, and public authorities were given the power to access communications data without a warrant.... In the US, the ‘Patriot Act’ authorised the use of telephone wire-taps and internet monitoring software, granted the power to conduct ‘sneak and peek’ searches without letting the target know, and required libraries, bookstores and other organisations to provide records of their customers.... There is a danger that we may be modelling our society in the image of something we once feared – the controlling and all-seeing State, monitoring our every move (Williams, 2004).

The Orwellian dystopia, with the state overly armed and increasingly watching the activities of each and every individual, is now a living fear. But humans proved far more menacing and this resulted in the creative reproduction of newer dystopias. Indeed, another novelist, this time of the twenty-first century, came up with yet another equally frightening dystopia, interestingly not by challenging Orwell but by taking a cue from him.

Having lived through the Orwellian world, Haruki Murakami (born in Kyoto in 1949) comes up with a startling, somewhat terrifying, dystopia in his trilogy titled *1Q84*, published in 2009-2010. Murakami ingeniously turns Orwell’s dystopia into an open-ended one by inserting the letter ‘Q’ in place of ‘9,’ now that the year 1984 is no more. It may be mentioned that the number ‘9’ in the Japanese is pronounced as ‘cue’ or ‘Q,’ and so Murakami, in the

light of the changing circumstances, reproduces the spectre of a newer dystopia without displacing or belittling the Orwellian one. And there lies his brilliance. Indeed, taking cue from Orwell, Murakami now warns us that the 'Little People,' creeping out from the chrysalis in the dark hours of the night, spread and menace the world. The spectre of the terrifying 'Little People' got added to the Orwellian spectre of the terrifying 'Big Brother.' Even Aomame, otherwise a decent astute woman, although soon to be haunted by the more insidious 'Little People,' managed to get away after killing the woman-abuser, Mr. Miyama, with an ice pick-like needle, which she "had designed and made it herself" (Murakami, 2012). Like the 'Big Brother,' the 'Little People' are also 'overly armed' and are watching us constantly. This double-layered dystopia is what is now haunting us in the name of security threats.

In South Asia, as it would be the case in other parts of the world, the 'Big Brother' combines with the 'Little People' in complex, contradictory ways, creating havoc in the life and living of the humans. I will limit myself to three cases, all from South Asia.

Case I

Terrorism in the name of heaven

Questions could easily be raised, what made the Sufis come to South Asia and how could they so easily settle in an alien land? Or, for that matter, what made the Hanafi mazhab (school of thought) so prominent in South Asia? Answers to such queries varied. Some scholars sought the answers in the five hundred years of Muslim rule and the migration of the Muslims - Arabs, Turks, Persians and Afghans. This could have been a factor but it still does not tell us as to why the locals would accept the aliens, the migratory Muslims, without much conflict, since it is argued that, save in the north-west, the scale of violence had been negligible, for instance, in Bengal, which soon found itself with a sizeable number of Muslims. Voluntary conversion of the lower caste Hindus was another answer. This too remains unconvincing because if it was such a case why would it be limited to northern India and Bengal and not include other areas of South Asia, which too included immensely disempowered lower caste Hindus, like the Dalits, for instance, in Bihar and central India.

The answer probably lies in the tradition of public reasoning in South Asia. In fact, a cue can be taken from Rabindranath Tagore who summed it up in one of his very popular songs: "We are all Kings in the kingdom of our King. / Were it not so, how could we hope in our heart to meet him." This refers to the presence of a precise public reasoning in South Asia that has allowed tolerance and proto democratic norms to thrive culturally, with state politics and governance remaining largely insulated from this; indeed, as some would argue, on account of alien invasions and colonial imposition of things (Nandy, 1998). The merit of this argument lies in the fact that throughout its age-old civilizational quest South Asia had invited all kinds of social and religious discourses, including Brahmanism, Buddhism, Vashnavism, Janism, Hinduism, Tantricism, Sufism and Islam, and allowed even the Catholics and Protestants to settle down. Amartya Sen too alludes to this when he perceptively points out that "the tradition of public reasoning is closely related to the roots of

democracy across the globe (Sen, 2005).” In fact, when it comes to South Asia, the Sufi saints could easily impress upon the people with their message of love and brotherhood and settle down both near the shore and deep inside the land not because such messages were new but rather because South Asia had cultivated a public reasoning of tolerance for centuries. No one knows why this is so but the vagaries of the weather could certainly have contributed to it.

Not so different were the reasons for the relatively tolerant Hanafi mazhab to have a lasting impact on the Muslims of South Asia. Apart from the fact that both the Afghans and later the Mughals (the latter is the Persian name for Mongols who were Chagatai Turks) were Hanafis, the mazhab itself had been more tolerant and this allowed for its proliferation in South Asia. Such tolerance stretched from praying at the Sufi shrines by members of all religious communities, providing rights to women in matters relating to marriage, divorce and ownership of property, guaranteeing rights to other religious communities.

At the same time and in the earlier period of Muslim history, tolerance and proto-democratic norms prevailed in the relationship between different mazhabs. For instance, when Ibn Batuta, the famous Maliki traveller from Morocco, came to India, the infamous Mohammad bin Tughlaq, who was a Hanafi, had no problem in telling him to open a Maliki court and adjudicate the Malikis in matters relating to personal law, like, family property, marriage and divorce. Similar was the case with re-marriage, directing the women to visit the Maliki court, which followed a nine month waiting period, rather than seek resolution in the Hanafi court, which then followed a waiting period of ninety years, that is, till the cessation of menstruation ‘by reason of age’ (Zaman, 1961). Such tolerance was also there in other Muslim domains. In fact, research on the Ottoman Empire has shown that “Ottoman Hanafi judges occasionally transferred their own jurisdiction on a given matter to Shafi’i or Maliki judge if those schools were more likely to guard the interests of the plaintiffs than the Hanafi school (Tucker, 1998).” One must quickly point out, however, that no such flexibility could be found amongst the Hanbalis or their successors, the Salafis or Wahhabis, in their doctrinal dispute or differences with other Islamic schools. I will have more to say about this shortly.

What changed all this? Or, more specifically, why is there so much intolerance in the name of Islam in South Asia now? Two factors could easily be cited. Firstly, the rise of petrodollars and the Salafization or Wahhabization of Islam. Never in the history of Islamic civilization did we find the Salafi or Wahhabi creed making an impact to the level it has done in recent times. Even on its home soil, Saudi Arabia, it has always remained a minority compared to the devotees of other Sunni schools. Critics see the skyrocketing of crude oil prices from around USD 3 per barrel in 1970 to more than USD 35 in 1980 and now USD 94 contributing to Saudi wealth and having it boldly utilized in the business of globally proselytizing the Saudi strain of Wahhabi Islam (Abukhalil, 2004).

Secondly, South Asian diaspora and puritanism. The post-national South Asian diaspora in the Middle East could not help but be attracted to a puritan

version of Islam and in turn help promote the Wahhabization of Islam in South Asia. If London and New York are considered as the citadels of modernity then Saudi Arabia with two holy cities of Mecca and Medina remains for many a Muslim believer the bastion of authentic Islam. Whatever goes there becomes the marker of Islamic identity, the export of which to the homeland on the part of the diaspora turns into an Islamic responsibility. Members of the diaspora, for instance, send money back home, but often with a call to maintain a strict religious code in the family, including the dress to be worn in public. At the same time, given the non-commercialization of Zakat and little or no knowledge of Islamic banking opportunities, coupled with the factor of doing something noble for the homeland, the diaspora also end up sending money to mosques and madrasahs, often without keeping a track of who is doing what with the money. In fact, there is no guarantee that part of the financial support would not end up funding the militant outfits. And this becomes more deadly when one particular mazhab wants to impose its interpretation of Islam on the followers of other mazhabs. Much of the intolerance and violence arise from inter- and intra-mazhab contestations. And it is here that the ‘Big Brother,’ often to promote its own narrow interests, if not for reasons of mazhabi zeal, allows the ‘Little People’ to flourish.

Pakistan would be a good example. Table 1 is a classical case of ‘Muslims killing Muslims (Roberts, 2008).’ In fact, a cursory look at Table 1 will show that Pakistan is in the midst of a conflict not only between the Shias and the Sunnis but also between the Salafis and the Hanafis, on the one hand, and between the Deobandis and the Barelwis, on the other. Although the latter two are both Hanafis but lately the Deobandis have become infected with Salafi rituals and ideas (Allen, 2006), and this has contributed to the rise not only of inter-mazhab but also of intra-mazhab conflicts.

Table 1
Timeline of suicide bomb attacks in Pakistan: 2007-2011

Date	Place	Number of People Killed
1 April 2011	Sufi shrine in Dera Ghazi Khan district	41
5 November 2010	Attack on the mosque at Darra Adam Khel	68
October 2010	Sufi Shrine in Punjab province	25
10 July 2010	Kakaghund in Northwest Pakistan	102
1 January 2010	Volleyball game, Bannu, Northwest Pakistan	88
28 December 2009	Shia procession in Karachi	43
24 October 2009	Near the Pakistan-Afghan frontier	39
12 October 2009	Northwest Pakistan	41
9 October 2009	Peshawar	125

Date	Place	Number of People Killed
18 September 2009	Shia-owned hotel in Northwest Pakistan	33
5 June 2009	Attack on the mosque, Upper Dir, Swat valley	40
27 March 2009	Attack on the mosque in Peshawar-Torkham	83
10 October 2008	Tribal area	85
20 September 2008	Marriott Hotel in Islamabad	60
16 February 2008	Parachinar	47
10 January 2008	High Court in Lahore	22
21 December 2007	Attack on the mosque, Eid Day, Northwest Pakistan	41
19 October 2007	Benazir Bhutto's motorcade in Karachi	139
4 September 2007	Rawalpindi	25

In fact, once the mind becomes intolerant then recourse to violence becomes difficult to stop. It may be pointed out that the suicide bomber who blew himself up in the busy market in northwest Pakistan, killing 41 people, on 12 October 2009 was only 12 years old (Roberts, 2011). Indeed, hordes of 'Little People,' ideologically-motivated and increasingly intolerant, and no doubt with some form of blessings from the 'Big Brother,' have come to menace the world. And this has created the spectre of fear in the life and living of the ordinary humans.

Table 2
Firing and Death in Indo-Bangladesh Border 2006-2010 (till 31 October)

Year	Incident of Firing	Deaths in firing	
		Bangladheisi killed	Indians Killed
2006	688	97	49
2007	791	81	56
2008	572	46	37
2009	598	48	39
2010	218	22	18

Case II

Cow smuggling and the state of insecurity

The issue of security with India has taken a different turn for Bangladesh in recent times, particularly in the backdrop of BSF (Border Security Force of India) firing in the border area. In fact, over the past 10 years BSF killed

over 1,000 people, mostly Bangladeshis, turning the border area into, as one reporter commented, “a South Asian killing fields (Adams, 2011).” BSF, however, contends that criminal elements, mainly smugglers, were shot at and killed in the border area, and back this up by providing figures of both Bangladeshis and Indians killed as a result of BSF firing (Table 2).

Border Guards of Bangladesh (BGB), however, provide a higher death figure of the number of Bangladeshis killed from BSF firing. According to BGB, 1154 Bangladeshi civilians and 16 BGB personnel were killed by the BSF in the period between 1972 and September 2010. BGB incidentally do not keep a tally of Indians killed as a result of BSF firing. Two things emerge very clearly from the above set of statistics. Firstly, all incidents of firing have taken place on the Indian territory. And secondly, most incidents of firing relate to cattle smuggling. This requires further exposition.

1.5 million cows worth USD 500 million are smuggled from India into Bangladesh each year, according to one report (Rahman, 2012). Some findings have even higher figures, but the question that merits attention is why are the cows smuggled? Why the cows cannot cross over to Bangladesh from India legally? When such questions were raised in one of the Indo-Bangladesh Track Two dialogues, held in Dhaka on 16 July 2011, the Indian delegation mentioned that live cattle cannot be exported legally because of religion. Since cow is sacred to the Hindus any attempt to de-smugglize the animal would face resistance from the Hindu fundamentalists, including the main opposition party in India, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). And this no political party in India, including the publicly proclaimed secular Congress, would be willing to do.

But then how valid is this contention? Frankly, shrouded in a mystery. This is because India does export live bovine animals, including cattle, and Nepal over the years has been the leading market for Indian live animals (Science Tech Entrepreneur, 2012). Export Policy of the Government of India, however, mentions that export of live cattle and buffaloes are “restricted,” that is, “permitted under license” while export of beef of cows, oxen and calf are “prohibited (Government of India, 2012).” But then Ritambhara Singh in the 2010 Annual Report on India’s Livestock and Products points out:

Buffalo cows, particularly those which have completed their lactation cycles, are predominantly used for meat. There are about 3,900 licensed slaughter houses in the country authorized by local bodies. In addition, there are around 26,000 unauthorized slaughter houses. However, there are now 13 export-oriented, modern, integrated abattoirs or meat processing plants registered with the Agricultural and Processed Food Export Development Authority (APEDA). There are also 24 meat processing and packaging units, which receive dressed carcasses from approved municipal slaughter houses for the export of meat. It is likely that other export plants will be developed in the future given India’s export focus (Singh, 2012).

And this despite the fact of having anti-cow slaughter legislation in several Indian states, although Paschim Banga, from where the bulk of the cattle enter illegally into Bangladesh, is not one of them. Beef, it must be pointed out, is consumed in Paschim Banga as well. Why the restriction in exporting cattle to Bangladesh then? The most likely reason is that the profit from cattle-smuggling is so hefty that few in the power are in a position to stop it. It may be pointed out that a cow in Jharkhand in India can be bought for USD 100, but when this cow enters Bangladesh its price can become as high as USD 350 to 900 (Rahman, 2009). Another estimate showed that BSF captured 70,000 Indian cows worth USD 62 million in Bangladesh in 2008 (Rahman, 2009). In fact, according to a survey carried out in 2002, 43 percent of the total value of illegal trade, which now stands to the tune of USD 2.7 billion annually in favour of India, is live cows and buffaloes (The World Bank, 2006). And it is this lucrative profit which is making policymakers at the highest level in Delhi unable to stop not only cow smuggling but also BSF firing.

Indeed, the 'Little People,' here in the guise of smugglers, women traffickers, money launderers, small arms dealers, and the like, are now heavily involved in all such lucrative businesses, no doubt in connivance with some of the members of the 'Big Brother' (security agencies, custom officials, elected representatives, even members of the judiciary) on both sides of the border. And this has given rise to newer forms of insecurity, complicating the state of relationship between India and Bangladesh. In fact, even after getting assurance from the top leaders of the government of both India and Bangladesh, whether on the issue of putting an end to the BSF firing on unarmed Bangladeshis or stopping the cow smugglers from unlawfully crossing the borders into India, the 'Little People,' indeed, with the complicity of the 'Big Brother,' continue to thrive and jeopardize the state of security between the two countries.

Case III

The decline of the 'Big Brother' and the rise of the 'Little People'

South Asians are not good at building institutions, more particularly state institutions. In fact, when it comes to identifying the oldest continuing institutions in South Asia one can at best point out to the 'sweet shops' (going back to the days of great-great-grand parents) and not governmental or state institutions. Protracted foreign invasions, including colonialism, could be responsible for this, but more important, I believe, is the precise manner in which the South Asians have dealt with the state (*rashtra*) and society (*samaj*), something which Rabindranath Tagore too went on to highlight. South Asians have civilizationally remained linked to their *samaj*, almost to the point of being negligent towards the *rashtra*, the state. As Tagore pointed out,

Through all the fights and intrigues and deceptions of her earlier history India had remained aloof. Because her homes, her fields, her temples of worship, her schools, where her teachers and students lived together in the atmosphere of simplicity and devotion and learning, her village self-government with its simple laws and peaceful administration—all these truly belonged to her. But her thrones were not her concern. They passed over her head like clouds, now

tinged with purple gorgeousness, now black with the threat of thunder. Often they brought devastations in their wake, but they were like catastrophes of nature whose traces are soon forgotten (Tagore, 1918, p7).

But then colonialism brought an end to all this, as Tagore reminded us, But this time it was different. It was not a mere drift over her surface of life,—drift of cavalry and foot soldiers, richly caparisoned elephants, white tents and canopies, strings of patient camels bearing the loads of royalty, bands of kettle-drums and flutes, marble domes of mosques, palaces and tombs, like the bubbles of the foaming wine of extravagance; stories of treachery and loyal devotion, of changes of fortune, of dramatic surprises of fate. This time it was the Nation of the West driving its tentacles of machinery deep down into the soil...

We had known the hordes of Moghals and Pathans who invaded India, but we had known them as human races, with their own religions and customs, likes and dislikes,—we had never known them as a nation. We loved and hated them as occasions arose; we fought for them and against them, talked with them in a language which was theirs as well as our own, and guided the destiny of the Empire in which we had our active share. But this time we had to deal, not with kings, not with human races, but with a nation—we, who are no nation ourselves.

Now let us from our own experience answer the question, What is this Nation? A nation, in the sense of the political and economic union of a people, is that aspect which a whole population assumes when organized for a mechanical purpose (Tagore, 1918, p9).

And it is this mechanical organization of the ‘nation,’ at times in the name of religion, at times language or ethnicity, that contributed to the breakdown of age-old institutions reproducing diversity and non-conformism, as it had been with samaj in pre-colonial times, indeed, to a point that led to the partition of colonial India into ‘nation-states,’ first, modern India and Pakistan in 1947, and then Bangladesh in 1971. As a result of this breakdown, institutions in post-colonial South Asia either remained weak or could not develop at all, and this included state institutions as well.

The vacuum came to be filled up mainly by a political-bureaucratic-business nexus, reproducing, if anything, misgovernance. In the case of India, for instance, Gurcharan Das in his book, *The Difficulty of Being Good*, published in 2009, pointed out that 1 out of 5 members elected in the Indian Parliament in 2004 had criminal charges against him. Equally shockingly, 1 out of every 4 teachers in government primary schools remains absent. But that is not all. 2 out of 5 doctors do not show up at state primary health centres while 69% of their medicines are stolen. Given the high-profile corruption scandals in recent times, one after another, there is every reason to believe that when it comes to governance things are getting from bad to worse in India. Pakistan’s case is even more dismal. National election in 2013 was historic, mainly because of the fact that Pakistan for the first time ever since it achieved its independence

in 1947 had a national election after the end of five-year tenure of an elected regime. It can safely be said that state institutions promoting democracy and good governance in Pakistan are at a rudimentary stage.

Bangladesh's case is even more dismal. An overwhelming majority of the parliamentarians in Bangladesh have business links and about 30% of them own ready-made garment (RMG) factories. More specifically, in the last parliament the ruling Awami League (AL) had 235 members with 120 self-declared businessmen while the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), the main opposition party, had only 30 parliamentarians with 18 of them self-declared businessmen. Why so many businessmen in politics? One quick answer would be that in Bangladesh business thrives through underhand dealings with politicians and government officials. Business houses are able to flout all rules and regulations, from getting licenses, acquiring land, building the infrastructures to ignoring safety measures. Following a recent building collapse near Dhaka, which housed several RMG factories and killed more than 1100 workers, Charles Kernaghan, the executive director of the Institute for Global Labour and Human Rights, said: "You can't trust many buildings in Bangladesh. It's so corrupt that you can buy off anybody and there won't be any retribution (Independent 2013)." Since no one was brought to justice in earlier instances of similar kind, Kernaghan has good reasons to remain sceptic about the rule of law in Bangladesh. The owners of such buildings can easily get away from any kind of retribution largely because of their connections with the ruling party, be it AL or BNP. And it is this connection that the business houses tend to cultivate with the political party, either AL or BNP, hoping to take advantage once the party of choice is in power. The party, of course, benefits from the donation, more illegal than legal on account of non-transparency, from the businesses.

The political-bureaucratic nexus is no better. In fact, incumbent bureaucrats get promotion through political blessings. Both AL and BNP have used their powers while in office to politicize the civil bureaucracy by making it a means of patronage. This has bred pressures among civil bureaucrats to remain close to one party or the other in order to secure good postings and promotions. One figure indicates that in 2008-2009 after the AL-led government assumed office, as many as 276 officials of the civil bureaucracy (six secretaries, 30 additional secretaries, 162 joint secretaries and 78 deputy secretaries) were made officers on special duty (OSDs), while 285 officials (presumably AL sympathizers) of the civil administration were recruited on the basis of contracts. On the other hand, during the first 20 months of the BNP-led government in 2001-2006, 300 officers of the civil administration were made OSDs and 144 (presumably pro-BNP) officers of the civil administration were recruited. It may be mentioned that in Bangladesh the OSD has the stigma of being called the "officer on sleeping duty", as they have a reputation for ending up in the corridors of the administrative building, often without a room, doing nothing. As a result, the machinery of government and the civil administration itself have become a means of serving the narrow interests of the ruling party. The civil bureaucracy otherwise remains highly partisan and is devoid of professionalism.

It is worth pointing out here that in Bangladesh, save the military, and that again probably for structural compulsions (the military personnel has to face live ammunition) there is a dearth of professionalism in almost all the institutions, whether civil bureaucracy, business houses, academic institutions, media agencies, even political parties. In fact, when it comes to professionalism political parties are the least professional; the top brass in almost all of them come to hold their position through kinship and patrimonialism. And this creates space for the 'Little People' to thrive as they become indispensable in reproducing authoritarian and corrupt practices both within and outside the party. This has become deadlier in the age of globalization now that the 'Little People' have easier access to illicit arms (Ahmed 2009). The seizure of 10 truckloads of illicit arms in Bangladesh in April 2004, which included a total of 4,930 different types of sophisticated firearms; 27,020 grenades; 840 rocket launchers, 300 rockets, 2,000 grenade launching tubes; 6,392 magazines; and 11,40,520 bullets, is a good example in this context (Wikipedia, 2013). Weak state institutions not only contribute to the decline of the 'Big Brother' but also for the want of newer structures and creative replacement of the existing ones tend to empower the terrifying 'Little People.' And that's the fear that has come to haunt us all.

Conclusion

Ensuring security in contemporary times

A combination of two approaches is required. The first one could be called the statist, and for the sake of remembering the various components it could be summed up as the 4 I's. These include:

1. Incarceration. This has been the traditional task of the state, policing and imprisoning the citizens for breaking the laws. But as it is now evident this task alone is not enough to contain the current security threats, particularly those emanating from the 'Little People' – the street thugs, smugglers, women and child traffickers, money-launderers, narco-dealers, terrorists, and the like. Moreover, since the policy of incarceration can only be 'reactive' the latter always remains one step behind the menacing deeds of the 'Little People.' Given the world that we are now in, with intolerant minds nurturing demonic ideas and in possession of deadly weapons, what is required is the simultaneous nurturing of 'proactive' policies for containing the terror.

2. Intelligence reforms. Intelligence agencies established in the 19th and 20th centuries, with the requirements of the Westphalian modern state in mind, cannot effectively deal with the non-state elements in the age of globalization. This became even clearer when the US with a trillion-dollar military budget could not stop 19 non-state 'Little People' from carrying out the demonic feat, killing 3000 residents and causing an instant financial loss of USD 60 billion. Not surprisingly, the US too came up with a new structure, the Homeland Security. Although it is too early to say whether the inclusion of

a new security structure in addition to the 1,271 government organizations and 1,931 private companies working in 10,000 locations in the United States on counterterrorism, homeland security and intelligence would make a difference to the security threats facing the US (Priest and Arkin, 2010), but it does suggest that the existing ones are not sufficient. Keeping the ‘Little People’ in perspective it can be said without hesitation that a greater involvement of the humans is required. But then if the latter remains dissatisfied and disempowered expecting credible support from them could be nothing more than wishful thinking. I will return to this shortly.

3. Intellectual intervention. There is a certain truism in the statement that “Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed (Unesco, 2013).” Put differently, the intolerant mind has to be addressed and the fresh ones contained. Since with respect to the Islamic militancy, for instance, there is so much inter- and intra-mazhab contestations, indeed, on the top of Shia-Sunni conflicts, there is a dire need for an intellectual investment in the Islamic scholarship. And this requires an international effort where a tolerant understanding of Islam could be codified and disseminated across the globe.

4. Institutional investment. Fighting insecurity and terrorism or the ‘Little People’ are no longer possible on an ad hoc basis. A protracted institutional investment is required with stakeholders from all sectors, including security agencies, academicians, researchers, media, feminist groups, business people, and the like, multidisciplinary at the same time, researching and participating in understanding, analysing and predicting the security threats, and suggesting ways to contain them. Since the ‘Little People’ are increasingly becoming creative in carrying out demonic activities, an equally creative if not more is required to contain them.

But then since the 4 I’s are statist in nature and the state or the ‘Big Brother’ is equally to be blamed for the state of insecurity there is an urgent need for carrying out a non-statist or human-centered approach to contain terrorism. And this brings us back to Rabindranath Tagore who in one of his last writings pointed out: “Manusher proti biswas harano paap, shey biswas shesh porjonto rakkha korbo (I shall not commit the grievous sin of losing faith in humans) (Tagore, 1996, 764).” It is after all humans that can lift us from the current state of insecurity, and therefore the focus ought to be on the humans, but then considering them not as universalized but rather multiversed beings. I will limit myself to five areas.

Homo politicus

Aristotle probably was the first one to proclaim that each and every human is a ‘political being’ - homo politicus - and therefore has certain inherent political rights (Kesby, 2012). The republican conception of politics is what Aristotle was advocating, indeed, at a time when the monarch was blessed with ‘divine rights.’ But then in the light of the colonial legacy and the reproduction of the over-developed state in contemporary times, how far have we succeeded

in safeguarding the political rights of each and every human in South Asia? Certainly there has been some progress, but in the backdrop of militancy in the Swat Valley, Northeast India, the alienation of the Hill people in Bangladesh, imprisonment of dissenters, policing of the civil society and incidents like Jaffna, Gujarat and Ramu and the bashing of the minorities few will deny that the scenario is hardly conducive to being *homo politicus*. Indeed, the state of insecurity would continue unless and until the inherent political rights of each and every person are guaranteed.

Homo economicus

Humans are also *homo economicus* or economic beings, as John Stuart Mill and Karl Marx have emphasised. That is, humans have inherent 'rights' to engage in economic activities for sustaining life and achieving economic prosperity. As Marx had said, 'humans are commodity-producers and profit-seekers.' This too has its limits in South Asia. Apart from the system of caste and class, which has 'disciplined' many a community in resigning to fate or divine justice, factors like geography and environment have consistently played out unfavourably with the marginalized and the disempowered, with the latter often ironically remaining 'grateful' with two-meal a day, a piece of cloth and a shelter to reside. Even Noble Laureate Muhammad Yunus' oft-quoted statement that 'all humans are entrepreneurs' saw its limits when micro-credit-worthy Bangladeshi women, largely because of patriarchy, found themselves unable to move beyond micro business while the government, far from aiding the latter, made a hurried call to 'shun' the Nobel Laureate and limit the power of the non-governmental sector (Kristof, 2011). Insecurity to humans could arise from not being able to live a life as *homo economicus*.

Homo culturicus

The strength of South Asians, however, lies not in their being as *homo politicus* or *homo economicus* but in their being as *homo culturicus* or cultural beings. South Asians, in fact, have not fared well politically, the 'democratic culture' has been marred by violence and divisiveness, or even economically, as the region is the home of the largest number of poverty stricken people in the world, but when it comes to 'cultural democracy' they have fared much better than many of the developed democratic societies of the world. Lalou, Ghalib and Tagore are living testimonies, so are Lata Mangeshkar, Monisha Koirala and Muttiah Muralitharan. If this be the case then it is important to mainstream culture and make use of it in containing the state of insecurity. But this would require a pool of talents whose concern for the marginalized and the disempowered may not be forthcoming for reasons of corporate sponsorship or state censorship, making the task no less challenging than the subject of security itself.

Homo technologicus

Human are also *homo technologicus* or technological beings. The productive use of newer technology in large numbers is what had contributed to human development for centuries. This is precisely what Gandhi had in mind when calling upon the people to use the charka (spinning-wheel). As Gandhi pointed out:

A wise man...will mean by the spinning-wheel not an article made of wood but any type of work which provides employment to all people (Gandhi, 2007).

Technology otherwise must be brought down to the level of the masses, only then it would cease to be an instrument of oppression. A case in point would be 'the mobilisation of talk, of communication, of information' (mobile phones, facebook, twitter, internet, television channels, and the like) (Myerson, 2001, p 61) so creatively used during the Arab Spring. Indeed, equipped with new technology, the people first came out one by one and then in hundreds and then in millions and after assembling at the Tahrir or Freedom Square in Cairo for eighteen days they finally succeeded in displacing Hosni Mubarak and restoring the dignity of the Egyptians. The movement itself was free from known political leadership and without a 'centre,' making it no less post-modern or post-archival in nature. South Asians can certainly take lessons from this, using newer technology in the task of organizing and mobilizing the humans for containing the state of insecurity reproduced by the 'Big Brother' and the 'Little People.'

Homo psychologicus

Finally, humans are homo psychologicus or psychological beings. Without a change in the 'mind-set' no people centred counter-terrorism, whether local, national or regional, could be undertaken. The task, however, is much more challenging at the regional level because the mind of the adult is already tuned to the national state, the 'Big Brother,' and often remains blinded by the latter. The merit of the plight of the cow smuggler, for instance, stops at the border. Humans must therefore engage in discourses of post-territoriality and post-nationality if counter-terrorism is to be made meaningful in South Asia. But this would require a creative mobilization of minds not only of the adults but also of the children of South Asia. The current state of technology could certainly prove handy in this regard.

Countering terrorism in contemporary times requires fresh insights and creative efforts, anything less would create space for the double-layered dystopias to play havoc in the minds and activities of the humans. This is as much a problem of Mumbai, Delhi, Dhaka, Karachi, Kabul, Jaffna, Islamabad, Shillong, and Kathmandu as it is of the world.

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Fostering Community Resilience for Preventing Violent Extremism: Perspectives from Central Asia

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Community resilience refers to the “capacity of a community to withstand, respond to and recover from a wide range of adverse events, either natural or caused by an individual or a group”. It is a measure of the sustained ability of a community to utilize available resources to respond to, withstand, and recover from adverse situations and to learn from past disasters to strengthen future response and recovery efforts. Community resilience is a term often associated with disaster risk reductions, preparedness to mitigate environment disasters, emergency response and the ability to recover in a way that restores normal functioning in society. Although resilience is a term most often used for development in risky environments (such as a natural disasters), it is increasingly used for a broader set of adversity: economic downturn, a pandemic, crime, conflicts and terrorism. This paper will focus on how community resilience can help prevent terrorism.

Key words: community resilience, radicalisation, terrorism, tolerance, extremism, counter terrorism, prevention

Introduction

In the fight against radicalization, violent extremism and terrorism, it is evident that traditional law-enforcement tactics are insufficient by themselves. They need to be complemented by more proactive approaches, which consist of responding to the threat of radicalization and violent extremism, or, preferably, preventing it. Responses concentrate on identifying and pursuing individuals and groups prone to violent extremism and terrorism, curbing the financing that sustains their efforts, preventing their travel across borders, data gathering, sharing and analysis for intelligence. Methods for prevention include understanding and tackling the motivations that drive people and groups to radicalization; monitoring the Internet and social media for materials that spread radical narratives and incite violent actions, awareness-raising and the promotion of a culture of peace, dialogue and tolerance via the mass media and education systems. The most effective long-term solutions would be to address the grievances that those vulnerable to radicalization purport to suffer

from. Grievance targeting could include addressing discrimination in society and job markets, encouraging more representative government, providing socio-economic opportunities, including employment possibilities, education and social programs for marginalized youth. All these strategies are based on targeting individual motivations: be they economic (poverty, economic insecurity), political (ideological, religious), personal (revenge, grievances and psychological) or communal (marginalization, horizontal inequalities, poverty, discrimination on the basis of religion and ethnicity.).

While social and communal factors influence motivations, less attention is often paid to the environment in which individuals are either radicalized or deradicalized and the role that families and communities might play in this regard. The question of communities tends to come into the equation of strategies to counter terrorism, violent extremism and radicalization under two different lenses: One scrutiny, based on a negative narrative, focuses on how the community creates conditions for its members to become radicalized. This for example can happen among members of a religious community (in certain madrassas for example where a particularly unforgiving version of Islam is being taught); in prisons which are notorious hotbeds of radicalization through exchanges among prisoners; and even within families which help recruit brothers, wives etc. into so-called Jihad, such as is often the case in Central Asia.

The positive narrative, on the other hand, sees the community as the potential vehicle for helping prevent violent extremism (PVE), combat its manifestations, and cope with its aftermath. Such a proposition is based on the potential of communities as long as they are made resilient. This paper will examine this potential positive narrative to examine under what circumstances community resilience can help prevent, combat and deal with violent extremism and what the pitfalls could be.

It first describes what community resilience entails, before examining the potential role in each of the stages (before, during and after). The paper then raises a number of challenges or risks associated with over-focus on communities on the question of PVE before making some general conclusions on what could be considered for further action.

Conceptualizing Community Resilience

Preventing violent extremism (PVE) policies, as opposed to purely counter-terrorism (CT) strategies that have traditionally focused on developing technical resilience through emergency response, protection of infrastructure etc., need to fostering resilience at the level of ideas to counteract the appeal of violent extremism and terrorism (Global Counter-Terrorism Forum, 2009). This requires a local approach to PVE, an approach that brings the state closer to communities. While the responsibility for preventing, combating and managing the consequences of terrorist acts lie primarily with the state, communities, much like civil society, the media and private sector, are also stakeholders interested in the successful outcomes of the efforts of the state.

As PVE is a shared responsibility based on mutual support between the state and communities.

The term ‘community’, though complex and subject to different interpretations, can be said to generally consist of “individuals, groups and institutions based in the same area and/or having shared interests”. As such, community can be seen as a stakeholder group concerned about common issues, and/or an entity made up of individuals within a specific geography, a town, region, country, etc. It goes without saying that individuals and groups often belong to more than one community. Communities of interest can also transcend borders and have global and transnational dimensions, with new technologies facilitating linkages around common issues of interest.

Community resilience refers to the “capacity of a community to withstand, respond to and recover from a wide range of adverse events, either natural or caused by an individual or a group” (Fran et al, 2008). Rand Corporation defines it as a measure of the sustained ability of a community to utilize available resources to respond to, withstand, and recover from adverse situations and to learn from past disasters to strengthen future response and recovery efforts (OSCE, 2014). Community resilience is a term often associated with disaster risk reductions, preparedness to mitigate environment disasters, emergency response and the ability to recover in a way that restores normal functioning in society. Although resilience is a term most often used for development in risky environments (such as a natural disasters), it is increasingly used for a broader set of adversity: economic downturn, a pandemic, crime, conflicts and terrorism.

Emphasis on community resilience represents a paradigm shift from emergency response and infrastructure development, which sees people as passive victims of adversity, to transforming them as agents of change, people who can make informed decisions about avoiding and reducing risks through their human action (Jason, 2009). As such, community resilience is a very appropriate approach for the field of countering and preventing violent extremism.

Community resilience is part of an equation that includes community cohesion, an equation that leads to community security: not just physical security against assaults, but also human security in the wider sense of the word which cover a range of issues affecting the quality of life of community members (safety, welfare, livelihoods, dignity etc.). Increasingly so, national CT and PVE policies aim to build resilient communities in order to protect them, and the nation subsequently, from violent ideologies and actions. Resilient communities are supposed to then join the efforts of the state in support of PVE and CT efforts. The state therefore has an important role to play in creating, encouraging and sustaining cohesion among and between communities while protecting them against harm.

When it comes to the relationship between the state and communities in PVE and CT efforts, however, distinction should be made between community-

targeted and community-oriented approaches. Community-targeted efforts, the more traditional practice in CT and even PVE, including in Central Asian countries, involves the state, driven by national security priorities, targeting communities for law enforcement and intelligence-gathering efforts. While these efforts, which should be carried out within the framework of law and respect for human rights, may be necessary, they may also alienate communities under scrutiny (Spalek, 2012). They also don't take into consideration the needs of the communities as a whole and its members separately (for example men and women). As such, they may run the risk of marginalizing or even stigmatizing some communities and individuals. On the other hand, community-oriented approaches, of which community resilience is a major pillar, are better suited for gaining the trust of local communities, consulting with them, involving them, and ultimately responsabilizing them as stakeholders in PVE and CT efforts. They also put community concerns and safety on the same par as the national security concerns of the state, with the understanding that the security of the state depends on the human security of its citizens.

There is a growing recognition worldwide and in Central Asia that involving communities and building their resilience turns them from passive objects of law enforcement activities to active stakeholders. Such initiatives can also contribute to increased accountability of decision makers to citizens while strengthening public confidence in the states' security policies, measures and institutions of law and order.

Community resilience can be both the goal/vision/objective to achieve as well as a strategy/methodology/tool, a means to get toward the desired goals. In practice, resilience becomes a strategy and a vision for three stages: 1) prevention, 2) combating and 3) dealing with the aftermath of violent extremism and terrorism.

Community Resilience in Practice: Examples from Central Asia

Prevention

A resilient community is one that can detect and prevent radicalization that can lead to violent extremism and potentially terrorism. Resilience through community-oriented approaches requires community engagement, strong social networks and ties, communication, and multi-sector partnerships between government and communities. It can also be built through engagement with a variety of credible community actors, each requiring a specific kind of approach and strategy.

- Families: In traditional societies such as those in Central Asia, where extended family ties are important vehicles for identity and support, there have been many cases of husbands influencing their wives and children to join them in fighting zones such as in Iraq and Syria, or even cases when women have agitated the youth for war in the name of "jihad". However, families can also be key stakeholders who can help identify and respond early to manifestations of violent extremism, and further dissuading their members from joining

extremist groups. Mothers, fathers, siblings and close family circles can be crucial conduits of positive values, traditions and worldviews. They can also help detect early signs of engagement with violent ideas or activities. Building resilience for families would entail raising awareness of its members, building trust with authorities, bringing them out of isolation, especially women whose great potential as moral authority can be downplayed by patriarchy or lack of economic empowerment. The role of fathers should also not be neglected, given how an absent father figure can lead to feelings of resentment and isolation, something very worrying in the Central Asian context of massive labor migration and the disruption of family bonds.

- Cultural and religious leaders: Much has been written and said about radicalization that is supposed to stem from sermons and teachings of some clergies' narrow interpretations of Islam in madrasas and mosques of the region. At the same time, however, cultural and religious leaders/Imams who are close to communities and trusted by its members can also play a positive role by raising awareness about true religious principles and counter extremist narratives. Religious figures in Central Asia can become figures of moral authority instead of agents of recruitment into takfiri ideology. Building resilience among religious communities would require building trust among leaders both with state authorities and community members. It would also require legitimacy, religious proficiency that can provide authority, and a generally supportive environment. In the Central Asian region, the state has increasingly interfered in the affairs of religious leaders, specifying for example the topic of Friday sermons, registering and controlling madrasas, banning public servants from attending mosques and providing certification of Imam Khatibs. Balance is needed between undermining the role of religious leader through cooption and control and giving free hand to those preaching intolerance and violence.

- Education institutions can help build resilience to prevent violent extremism at the community level. As the former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair observed in his speech at the UN Security Council in November 2013, "The root causes of extremism will never be defeated by security measures, only the education of young people can achieve their demise." Especially in Central Asia where budget for and quality of education institutions have taken a heavy toll during times of crisis and transition, formal and non-formal education and life-skills need to be on top of the agenda of local authorities. Educational institutions are an important point of interaction for families and communities when values and lessons imparted in the classroom can be reinforced at home. Teachers can also play a role as moral authority if they are trusted.

- Youth groups could also be credible community actors to build resilience for the prevention approach. When they are ostracized, marginalized, excluded, unemployed and frustrated, they are the vulnerable group potentially subject to recruitment and radicalization. But not all angry young people are voicing their grievances through radicalization. When their resilience is high, they can show by example the possibility of engaging in civic action, local politics, and cultural

and education avenues to lobby for their needs. Tajikistan has an example of a youth group “Avangard”, set up in August 2015 to combat the spread of radical ideas among Tajik youth. They have collaborated with authorities to travels among young migrants in Russia in order to hold discussions on respect for the foundations of the state, national values etc., all in view of dissuading potential recruitment. What can tip a potentially disgruntled group of young people from victims or recruiters of extremist groups to advocates for peace and unity within the community is the trust that the state can incite in its relationships with them. In this process of trust and confidence building, the importance of providing jobs, avenues for political participation, hope and dignity for a better alternative future is primordial for success. Attention should therefore not only be paid to youth leaders but also to marginalized youths who may be most vulnerable to recruitment by extremists.

Response

Community resilience is not only a strategy for preventing violent extremism but can also be a way for communities to combat extremism as it happens. Communities can be made responsible for establishing their own secure environment. One way to do that is to engage them in a more community-centric and collaborative approach to policing.

Where trust is built, communities can help the police in keeping vigilance, intelligence gathering and in making arrests, while the police, when seen as a resourceful and efficient institution, can be a point of referral and contact for communities in need for protection. Community policing does not mean citizen’s arrest practices or rendering of justice by communities directly. It means proper and effective interaction between the police with families and communities.

Community policing is “a philosophy and organizational strategy that promotes a partnership-based collaborative effort between the police and the community to more efficiently identify, prevent and solve problems at the local level. It shifts the focus of police by placing equal emphasis on crime control, order maintenance, and service provision” (Hedayah Center and Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2009).

The principle idea behind this concept is the partnership necessary between the community and the police based on mutual need and trust. The legitimacy of the policy can increase in the views of the community when consent is sought in matters of local law and order, and public service delivery is tangibly improved (Blair, 2013). The public can in turn be encouraged to share with the police its concerns information, and to report any suspicious activity. The police however should not be seen as meddling between community members or taking sides in local disputes in biased ways that would then endanger its credibility, legitimacy and neutrality.

The role of the state in building resilience for communities to combat violent extremism would be to provide adequate information, improve communication

with communities on its CT activities and policies, make information about protective measures available and accessible, provide credible assessments of terrorist threats, etc.. Public support would also depend much on the respect for human rights and rule of law that state institutions display.

Aftermath

Resilience building for communities that have undergone a traumatic event, such as terrorism, or who have in their midst ex-combatant and foreign fighter returnees requires particular types of initiatives. In order to increase their resilience following a terrorist attack, local communities should pre-plan and prepare their responses, including to persons harmed and injured. Support and practical assistance needs to be immediately mobilized for the victims and survivors of the incident, and the support continued in the long-term in order to help prevent isolation, grief, anger and other negative outcomes that are harmful to communities. Response needs to start with planning ahead through a comprehensive plan which goes beyond immediate emergency response and physical rescue/recovery of victims to providing support and after-care measures to victims and survivors over the short, medium and long-term. The Canadian government has for example prepared a Checklist (Mathew, 2013), which consists of 9 broad categories based on information and lessons learned from international experiences that can help prepare and enhance a community's capacity to respond to victims.

When a former radicalized person (assuming one who has not been imprisoned) is reintegrated into his/her family and community, he/she needs special support for de-radicalization and disengagement. While the provision of skills, employment, education, healthcare etc., are primordial responsibilities of the state in order to prevent radicalization in the first place they also become services needed in the process of sustainable rehabilitation afterwards. Hope and dignity for a better alternative future is primordial for success. Once disengaged and rehabilitated, former extremists and radicals can also become a great voice of experience for countering radicalization among their communities and peers.

The community and family also need to be supported in order to accept and reintegrate the former extremist in their midst. This support should be in terms of resources, but also moral, psychological and social. Typically government-led, donor supported programs on DDR (Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration) or on the reintegration of former combatants, put aside small grants for communities willing to host (back) ex-combatants in their midst. These grants, geared towards small infrastructure or social projects, are supposed to act as incentives for the cooperation of the communities with returnees. The UNDP supported Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) is an example in the region with a host of lessons for the future as Central Asian countries prepare for the return of former ISIS members from Iraq and Syria. Below, we shall return to the pitfalls of distributing aid on the basis of not needs but of cooperation with security institutions.

Whether former violent extremists are in prison or not, families can play a particularly critical role in the psycho-social rehabilitation process by

reengaging with them, helping the deradicalization process through support or pressure, etc.

Risks of Over-focus on Communities

While community resilience seems to be an optimal tool and a vision for the prevention of, response to and recovery from violent extremism, over-reliance on it by the state and international organizations is not without challenges. Resilience building can deliver tangible benefits but there are also inherent risks that should be highlighted. These include:

1) Ostracizing and stigmatizing particular communities by putting them under scrutiny: When a community is singled out by the state as being home to extremists, not only is resilience undermined but isolation and even confrontation ensues. Stigmatization gives the false impression that there are problem communities that are more vulnerable to extremism than others, while in reality it would be a damning sentence on an entire community based on the actions of few individuals. Over-focus on some communities has already undermined the reputation, often underserved, of particular town/entities (for example villages from which a large number of young men who have been recruited into ISIS have called home in Central Asia) or religious communities (notably, the community of Muslims in European cities for example, especially those that hail from neighborhoods where Jihadist have been living, such as the notorious Molenbeek in Belgium for example).

2) Cooption of communities by the state for security purposes: This paper has made the case that the resilience of communities depends on how much their needs have been taken into consideration and trust is built with state authorities. If communities become mere pawns in the security interests of the state, then mistrust, misperceptions and tensions can actually grow, especially if there have already been cases of police misconduct. Engagement of law enforcement authorities with communities could be perceived as a cover for special operations aimed at gathering intelligence, monitoring and surveillance of particular communities. It is for this reason that community-oriented as opposed to community-targeted approaches are infinitely more important for long-term resilience building.

3) Interference from the outside: An effective community is primarily based on trust and confidence among its members. Change from outside can inevitably impact that trust, often for the better one would hope, but sometimes also for the worse. As the question of violent extremism and terrorism is extremely sensitive, overt and aggressive interference from outside of communities could unleash negative dynamics and backlash. It would be better if the communities evolved organically towards their resilience, supported by external actors, but given the space for autonomous action and digestion of new ideas and methods.

4) Politicization of aid to communities: As discussed above, support to communities on the basis of their cooperation with security imperatives of the state creates a distortion of the logic and rationale of humanitarian

and development assistance. The politicization of aid based on security conditionality can create negative precedence and inappropriate incentives.

Conclusions

Obviously, preventing and responding to violent extremism and terrorism is not solely the task of the police, of the security services, or of government. Local stakeholders, i.e. communities who are directly affected, should also be involved. Burden sharing is the only effective long-term strategy to adopt. While top down approaches are needed by the state to protect its citizens, create conditions and build confidence in the institutions of the state, bottom up initiatives are also necessary. That is where communities and people come in. Bottom up requires the activation of communities, families, religious leaders, youth and women's groups, private sector, neighborhood watches etc. Communities have an organic responsibility to protect their interests, claim their rights and contribute to local and national solutions. Their degree of resilience is the measure of success for the nation.

The state has an important role to play in creating, encouraging and sustaining cohesion, trust and confidence among all communities in society. It can do so by promoting a sense of identity that is both credible and enduring, and conditions for the security of communities. Cohesion and security are reinforced by and reinforce in turn the notion of resilience.

What would be the role of international organizations in this midst? The answer would be a fine balance between supporting top down and bottom up initiatives and helping them meet for a comprehensive, sustainable and nationally owned approach to violent extremism and terrorism. Too often the work of international organizations is isolation of one or the other pillar: Many build capacities of state security institutions without facilitating dialogue with communities and civil society organizations. Others over-focus on community development and resilience projects without emphasizing on linkages with national policies and plans. They should ensure that local initiatives are better aligned with government strategies and vice versa.

In the final analysis, resilience building requires long-term sustained solutions, patience and space for local autonomy. It is fundamentally based on the empowerment of people and communities so that they understand – and take action – that benefits the common good.

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